

Security Information

JUL 1 1953

OUTLINE FOR KOREAN BRIEFING

Brief statement - UN position

Commie reactions to specific elements of UN position

- instances where this reaction has been less or milder than we would have expected
- instances where reaction has failed to exploit fully UN vulnerabilities
- NK-CC reactions to 29 June Clark letter

Various indications Commie desire for truce

- Brief examination of evidence on and rejection of the unlikely among following possible Commie intentions -
 - 1) sign a truce and forgive all
 - 2) sign a truce but exploit to full UN embarrassment
 - 3) indifferent as to truce
 - 4) prefer no truce - use resumption of war as desire to break up US and Allies
 - 5) use truce negotiations as screen for all-out attack on UN and ROKs
 - WPC and Soviet propaganda line (ignoring Rhee release PW's, for example)
 - Soviet approach (Item 1 in 7/1 Bulletin, for example)
 - Any other neutral or Commie asides on this?
- Observation that Commies may be waiting to sandbag us in political conference
- Any indications of plans in that direction
 - Agenda items now or future likely to be exploitable by Commies
 - Observation that both Rhee and Commies likely to prolong conference beyond 90 days for their own reasons
 - Activities Rhee may undertake during conference to sabotage US position

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- 2 -

countered by assigning its troops to guard public buildings in the capital.

French army regulars in Cambodia exclusive of the latest reinforcements numbered 8,000. Also under French command are 9,000 native semi-military forces and 3,000 native auxiliaries to the French army whose loyalty in the event of French-Cambodian clash would be doubtful. The Royal Cambodian Army numbers 12,500 and includes two armored companies. French officers and noncom's comprise three percent of its total strength. It would be no match for the French forces in a frontal attack. Any French-Cambodian hostilities, however, would probably take a form similar to that in Vietnam: general insecurity outside of French-held urban centers.

The king's demands allow little room for negotiation. He wants France to grant Cambodia a status in the French Union comparable to that of a member of the British

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Commonwealth. While the French might shortly offer more concessions, they are not likely to give such complete independence, which would include the right to withdraw from the Union. The king's position is the harder for the French to accept in that Vietnam and Laos would immediately demand similar status.

At his border headquarters, the king is well situated to continue the effort he has been making over the past several weeks to assert his authority over several bands of non-Communist dissidents known as Khmer Issaraks, whose total strength may be 2,000 to 3,000. The king is reported to have won over several Issarak leaders, notably the widely popular Son Ngoc Thanh.

So long as French-Cambodian relations remain embittered, Viet Minh forces in Cambodia, numbering about 1,000, can be expected to exploit anti-French sentiment. The majority of the Cambodian guerrillas are, however, anti-Viet Minh, and French

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capitulation to Cambodian demands would probably improve
the prospects of the anti-Communist effort, provided the
French did not concurrently withdraw their military support.

Communist Position No Issue
Possibly Soviet more No Germany

NSC
2 July 53